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THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 

1S6S. 



V 

AN ADDRESS | 

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DELIVERED BEFORE THE 



MARYLAND HISTORICAL SOCIETY 



MARCH 13th, 1883, 



CLARENCE F. COBB, 

Late Private, dth Corps, V. S. Army. 



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WASHINGTON, D. C. : 

JUDD & DETVVEILER, PRINTERS. 

1891. 



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THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 

186S. 



An addrens delivered before the Maryland Historical Society. 



In jauntiDg about the battle-fields and studying in a crude 
way the campaigns of our war we cannot help beino- con- 
vinced that the Art of War has not improved for centuries. 
In this regard it much resembles other arts. Where has 
been the improvement in the plastic art since Phidias ? The 
broken-nosed Buonarroti, with all his genius, never turned 
from his deft hands a statue that could excel tliose foshioned 
by the mighty master who had passed away manv centuries 
before him. Where has been the improvement in the Build- 
ei-'s Art since the old masters reared the Parthenon and the 
Coliseum? The AlhamferR,.^t..Peters, and our Capitol are 
mere patch-work compared to them. Not that we wish to say 
there have not been minor improvements in AVar; in arms 
projectiles, &c., but it cannot be denied that the principles 
remain as they were during the wonderful campaigns of 
Hannibal. When General Lee was discussing with General 
Longstreet the then contemplated offensive campaign that 
ended so disastrously for their cause at Gettysburg, Lono-- 
street opposed it and advised that, instead of that movemeiit 
Bragg should be reinforced heavily, march north, defeat 
Kosecrans, continue, and by such means relieve Vicksburg 
Pie argued that Grant would be thus compelled to raise the 
siege and hasten to Rosecrans's aid. When one of Hanni- 
bal's armies was besieged in Capua by three Roman armies 
he conceived the idea, being outside with another army to 
march on Rome and thus raise the siege. This strategy 
was carried out with great success by Jackson when Mc- 



Clcllan was drawing his lines about Ilichmond in 1SG2, and 
it saved, the Confederate Capital for nearly three years. 

It is abominably hard to get at the truth of a battle. 
You would have a nice time in trying to convince an Eng- 
lishman that Wellington was beaten to a dead stand- still 
at Waterloo and would have retreated had not Bliicher 
marched from Wavre and doubled up Napoleon's flank; 
yet the French and Prussians stick to that. And you w^ould 
waste your labor should you try to make a Frenchman be- 
lieve that the Duke w^ould have defeated them if Bliicher 
had not come at all ; yet the English writers adhere to that. 
And you miglit pour a keg of beer into a Prussian, and marry 
his daughter, and smoke a long pipe with him till doomsday, 
and tell him the facts, yet he would not believe but the Eng- 
lish and the other troops under Wellington were defeated, 
and Bliicher saved them. All the world of literature issued 
since 1815 leaves Waterloo in just that muddle ; and that is 
what is the matter up here. 

After General Lee had defeated the Federal army on the 
Peninsula, then marched north and defeated General Pope, 
he was too wise to essay a direct attack on the fortifications 
of Washington, so he continued north, crossed the u]iper 
fords of the Potomac and took position at Frederick, Md. 
The consternation in Washington was great. There was a 
good, honest, tall, thin man in the Presidential Chair, and 
a short, stout man, who wore a beard and s})Octacles, but no 
mustache, was his immedmte__Mars, and under him was a 
bio--headed man, with two stars on each shoulder, and all 
this big^eaded man could boast of was his big head. He 
was full of theory to be sure, and had written military works, 
but there were so many ifs, ands and buts in his composition 
that he never did anything decisive but die in 1872, and 
there is a horrible suspicion abroad now that he would not 
have done that could he have helped it. 

Who was to command the Army of the Potomac? The 
big-headed man never thought of placing himself at its head 
it appears, although if he had any drive, and vim, and push, 



and dare in him, that is just where he belonged. The Ad- 
ministration thought of giving Banks the command, but it 
learned that he would decline it if offered, and it was not 
tendered. The bad feeling that had grown up against Mc- 
Clellan in Washington prevented its being offered to him at 
once, but he was placed over it finally, on Sept. 2d, and he 
marched it up into Maryland. 

The general situation of affairs in the early j^^n't of Sep- 
tember was about so : — The Confederate army was collected 
about Frederick in high morale, but very short of supplies. 
It, after its remarkable successes on the Peninsula and in 
front of Washington, looked upon itself as almost invincible, 
and it was eager to be attacked or attack whenever the Fed- 
eral army showed uncovered front. The Federal army was 
gathered about Washington and was suffering from that 
depression that always accompanies defeat ; but its supplies 
of all kinds were abundant, and reinforcements were being 
received daily from the north and west by rail. 

Whether General Lee's plans were to advance into Penn- 
nsylvania, or march upon Washington, he judged it wise to 
first leave the Valley of the Shenandoah clear of a hostile 
force. With this end in view he divided his army to sur- 
round Harper's Ferry, occupied by Col. Dixon S. Miles and 
12,000 or 13,000 Federal troops. The order directing this 
was dated Sept. 9, which was Tuesday, and it will be found 
in full on page 188 of McClellan's report. Jackson with 
three (3) divisions was to march from Frederick to Williams- 
port, cross the Potomac there, come down its west (right) 
bank and take possession of Bolivar heights. McLaws with 
two (2) divisions was to march via Middletown, through 
Middletown and' Pleasant valleys to seize Maryland heights. 
Walker with one division was to cross the Potomac below 
Harper's Ferry, march up its west (right) bank and secure 
Loudoun heights. These marches were begun oji Sept.^lOth ; 
they were made with great success, and on Se]>t. 15th Jack- 
son was in position on Bolivar, McLaws on Mar^dand, and 
Walker on Loudoun heights. Their artillery o])ened upon 



4 

the Federals, played about two hours, and then the flag of 
surrender was shown. The Confederates, not seeing the 
token, kept up tlie fire and Col. Miles was wounded after the 
flag was run up and died the next day. He was an eleve of the 
Military Academy, had seeii 38 years' service, and had been 
in command of Harper's Ferry for six months, therefore it 
cannot be pleaded that he did not know his ground. 

If you will take the capital letter Y, you will have the 
position of Harper's Ferry before you. The upright and 
upper right hand stroke is the Potomac ; the left hand stroke 
is the Shenandoah river which enters the Potomac and forms 
the crotch ; between these streams is the town of Harper's 
Ferry ; on the right of this letter Y, close to the river, are 
the Maryland heights ; on the left are the Loudoun heights ; 
in the crotch and back of the town are the Bolivar heights 
The key-point to the position is Maryland heights, which 
tower far above Loudoun and Bolivar, and artillery planted 
upon them commands the rest and could knock the town to 
pieces with a few dozen rounds ; yet strange to say, astonish- 
ing to relate, wonderful to be forced to record, Col. Miles, 
when the Confederates appeared, drew nearly all his forces 
into Harper's Ferry and staid till he was surrounded. It 
was in vain his officers urged him to abandon all else and 
})lace all his forces on Maryland heights ; in vain they argued 
with him that that was the key-point to the whole position. 
He had received orders to hold on to Harper's Ferry, and, 
interpreting such orders literally as applying to the town 
itself, he stuck to the town. It may be well to state that the 
southern face of Maryland heights is perpendicular, so it 
would have been but necessary for him to defend its north- 
ern slope. Had he transferred his whole force there and 
fortified it on the north, he could have laughed at the Con- 
federate attack, even though it had been supported by their 
whole army. He had assigned Col. Ford to hold the Mary- 
land heights, but Ford's action was infamously feeble — 
he spiked his guns, tumbled them down liill, retreated across 
to Harper's Ferry, and when IMcLaws secured these heights 



the game was up. The Confederates captured 12,000 men, 
73 pieces of artillery, many thousand small arms and large 
stores. 

There was a tremendous howl raised over this affair by 
the press of the north and west. Ford was dismissed from 
the service and Miles, though dead, was handled severely. It 
taught the Federal officers a harsh lesson, and the Confed- 
erates made no attempt to capture the position during the 
Gettysburg campaign. During Early's raid in 1864, Breck- 
enridge essayed it, but Sigel threw his own force on Mary- 
land heights and could have laughed at his assaults had he 
made them. 

The whole movement is a fruitful study for the military 
student, much resembling, though on a smaller scale, and 
though before Mack was surrounded, Napoleon's troops had 
not a single starting point as Lee's had, the concentration on 
Ulm in 1805, when Ney came from Lake Constance, Lannes 
from Upper Swabia, Soult and Davoust from Bavaria and 
tlie Palatinate, Bernadotte and Augereau from Franconia, 
and the Imperial Guard from Paris and they all jugged 
Mack in Ulm. And it much resembles too the concentra- 
tion by Wasliington of the contingents from New York and 
North Carolina, of new levies from Virginia, and the French 
fleet from the West Indies to besiege and capture Cornwallis 
a hundred years ago. 

Concentric movements on a large scale are usually con- 
demned by the writers on the Art of War, but here we see 
them crowned with complete success, and we are minded to 
ask what would have been theresult during the Seven Years 
War, when Frederick contended successfully against Austria, 
France, Russia, Saxony and Sweden, if those powers had 
placed their forces under one able head and surrounded him 
as Cornwallis was surrounded at Yorktown, Mack at Ulm, 
and Miles at Harper's Ferry ? 

The order referred to above also directed Longstreet to 
leave Frederick and march to Boonesboro', there to halt 
with the trains ; General D. H. Hill's division to act as the 



6 

rear guard, and Stuart ivith liis cavalry to cover the route 
and bring up all stragglers. The capture of Harper's Ferry 
was looked upon as sure, and after such capture Genl. Lee 
purposed concentrating his army at Boonsboro' or Hagers-,' 
town. Harper's Ferry fell, as we have seen, but all of Genl. 
Lee's plans after that were frustrated by a mere accident ; oa 
Sept. 13th, late in the afternoon, a copy of this order fell iviio 
Genl. McClellan's hands. The possession of this was a won- 
derful piece of good fortune to McClellan. It told him just 
liow and where Genl. Lee's divisions were scattered, and his 
own army was well in hand — so lie marched it from Fred- 
erick, over the Catoctin mountains, across the Middletown 
valley, and struck the Confederates on the South mountains, 
that are a continuation of the Blue Ridge. 

The battles of South mountain were foughti on Sunday, 
Sept. 14, 1862. The South mountains are not detached 
heights, but a chain of hills, and where the main battle 
was fought are about 1,000 feet high. Should you leave 
Frederick and go west about twelve miles, over the old 
National Pike, which was a busy road when steam was in 
its infancy and the stocks of stage companies were valuable, 
you would reach Turner's Gap ; some six miles south of 
which is Crampton's Gap. The former was defended that 
day by Generals D. H. Hill and Longstreet, the latter by a 
part of McLaws's command under Genl. Cobb. 

The Federal cavalry under Pleasanton developed the 
Confederate position, and the leading division of the 9th 
Corps, under Cox, dej^loyed to the south of the pike and ad- 
vanced to and up the mountain. The other divisions of this 
cor})s — Wilcox's, Sturgis's and Rodman's — in the course o^ 
the day turned south too and followed Cox. That placc^, 
the whole 9th Corps on the left and the able Jesse Reno 
commanded it. The 1st Corps under Joe Hooker marched 
up this pike jauntily and turned north to Mount Tabor 
church, where its leading division under Meade deployed 
facing west, and advanced u[) tlie mountain, and the 1st Mass. 
cavalry was sent fartlier north to defend the right flank. 



The otlier divif^ioiis of this corps were deployed as they came 
up; Hatch's on the left and Ricketts's, about 5 P. M., in the 
rear. Genl. Gibbon's brigade was detached from Hatch's 
division and sent straight up the pike to attack the center. 

That was the general disposition. The idea was to attack 
the Confederates on the right, left and center. The day was 
very warm and the men till 2 o'clock suffered much from 
the heat ; then it became cloudy and cool. Nothing daunted 
at so formidable a position they were in jolly spirits, and after 
several hours' bloody work they pressed the Confederates up 
the mountain, slowly, bloodily, but steadily, and secured the 
crest. All the firing did not cease till quite nine at night. 
Cox's division of the 9th Corps got to work earlier than any 
others on the Federal left and they crowded the Confederates 
up and back steadily. When he reached the crest there was 
no other division to support him and his ammunition was 
nearly gone. In such a situation he could only make his 
men lie down to escape the hostile fire and a North Carolina 
battery on their right and front sprinkled them with can- 
ister but they held their ground. By-and-by Wilcox, Stur- 
gis and Rodman, with their divisions, came clambering 
and fighting up to support, and when the line was formed 
Cox worked his division well around on the right flank and 
rear of the Confederates, and when the charge was sounded 
in they went with a rush, and the Confederates, doubly out- 
numbered, broke and retreated. ' 

Hooker with the 1st Corps fought his way up on the right. 
Meade commanded his right division and Seymour com- 
manded INIeade's right brigade, and he worked it around 
well on the rear and left flank of the Confederates, and forced 
them back there. In fact, the Federals had too many guns 
and men for the Confederates and out-flanked them right 
and left, besides, Gibbon attacked the center. The Confed- 
erates made a good fight ; a stubborn and tenacious resist- 
ance ; held on gallantly to every fence, stone wall, and ledge 
of rocks as they were crowded up and back. There were 
many places where it was hard for an unincumbered man 
to climb, so you can see that it was a severe struggle. On 



the Confederate right Genl. D. H. Hill commanded, on the 
left, Longstreet. They had but 15,000 men engaged. The 
Federals had 30,000, but the position was worth the differ- 
ence. The line as fought was quite three miles long. It 
was a long, sharp, bloody thirteen hours' pull. Genl. Reno 
was killed about sunset — as gallant a man as ever wore 
spurs ; as just a man as ever lived ; beloved by his men ; 
honored by all ; the man who did the brain-work of the 
North Carolina expedition ; the leading spirit at New Berne 
and Roanoke. Strange Providence beyond our ken, yet 
ever wise, that the life-blood of such a man should make fat 
a handful of earth on yonder lonesome heights. They have 
placed but a rough stone up there to mark wdiere he fell — 
he has a thousand living monuments in the hearts of his 
men of the Otli Corps. Genl. Garland, commanding a Con- 
federate brigade was killed here ; a christian gentleman of 
high character. 

Some six miles south of Turner's Gap, through the same 
mountains, is Crampton's Gap, and while the above was 
going on there was a side issue there. Genl. Franklin, with 
the 6th Corps, attacked there about 12 o'clock, with Slocum's, 
Newton's and Smith's divisions, forced the Confederates, who 
were commanded by Genl. Cobb, steadily up and back until 
he gained the crest and road, and the Confederates broke 
and retreated. Franklin's loss was 533 — Cobb's loss was a 
little over 000, 400 of which were prisoners. The Federal 
loss at Turner's Gap was 1,560 ; the Confederate loss was 
3,000, of which 1,500 were prisoners. During these engage- 
ments Genl. Lee's headquarters were at Boonsboro', at or near 
the widow Herr's house. 

McClellan has been criticised for fighting at Turner's Gap, 
it being held that he -should have amused Longstreet and 
Hill and they would have been obliged to retreat when 
Franklin broke through, as McC. could have thrown the 
whole Army of the Potomac through Crampton's Gap across 
Lee's line of retreat to the Potomac. That is very true, but 
that is wdiat the soldiers so pregnantly called " hindsight." 
If an officer could read the future, wdiat a General he would 



9 

be. A wagoii-iiiaster can stand on Mont St. Jean or La 
Belle Alliance noiv, and see where an Eni])eror erred, but 
that is hindsight too. In the field, in the rush and hurry 
of a campaign, a general must be governed by what is known 
to him, and by his previous education, unless he possess what 
Jomini is pleased to call the " Inspiration of War." We 
did not have a very great number with that prescience from 
1861 to 1865. 

This stubborn defense made at these gaps delayed the 
Federal army a full day, which enabled Genl. Lee to with- 
draw after night and take position behind the Antietam, 
where he could reunite his scattered divisions. The Fed- 
eral army followed the next morning, Monday, the 15th, the 
cavalry in the advance, and it made a handsome charge 
through the streets of Boonsboro' on the Confederate rear 
guard of mounted troops, scattering it and capturing 250 
prisoners and two guns. 

The battle at Turner's Gap was a defensive one for the 
Confederates and an offensive one for the Federals, and per- 
haps no battle ever illustrated in a more forcible way the 
proverbial inaccuracy of a down-hill fire. The Confederate 
fire seemed farcical excepting where canister was used. It 
much resembled Buena Vista, where Genl. Taylor, with only 
5,000 or 6,000 men, beat off 25,000 Mexicans ; but that was 
Anglo-Saxons against degenerate Latins, steel against lead — 
here it was steel against steel, and Providence, who is the 
best General after all, fought with the biggest battalions. 

No man could stand in Middletown Valley and look up 
the South Mountains and not realize that the Confederates 
had a great advantage in position in these two engagements 
but then it must be remembered that the Federals had an 
enormous advantage in numbers. 

The forcing these two passes gave the right wing of the 
Army of the Potomac, commanded by Burnside, comprising 
the 1st Corps under Hooker and the 9th Corps now under Cox, 
and the left wing, the 6th Corps under Franklin, free pass- 
age into Boonsboro' Valley and Pleasant Valley. Now, be 
2 



10 

it remembered that McLaws's two divisions had, under Genl. 
Lee's order, marclied down Pleasant Valley to seize Mary- 
land Heights, therefore Genl. McClellan ordered Genl, 
Franklin to fall upon McLaws, but, before Franklin could 
do this. Col. Miles had surrendered Harper's Ferry, and 
McLaws marched from Maryland Heights and formed line 
of battle to resist Franklin. Franklin deemed it unwise to 
attack and did not. 

The general situation on Monday morning, Sept. IStli, 
was about so : Harper's Ferry was surrendered ; the Confed- 
erates had lost the engagements at Turner's and Crampton's 
Gap ; Genl. Lee with Longstreet, D. H. Flill's and the most 
of Stuart's cavalry command, was taking position on the 
west (right) bank of the Antietam ; Genl. Jackson with 
three divisions and Walker with one were on the west 
(right) bank of the Potomac in the neighborhood of Har- 
per's Ferry ; McLaws's two divisions were in Pleasant Val- 
ley and about Maryland Heights, and the Army of the 
Potomac, excepting the Gth Corps in Pleasant Valley, was 
in Boonesboro' Valley, pressing Genl. Lee. 

As the Federals advanced they picked up many Confed- 
erates, stragglers, utterly worn out and many of them bare- 
footed. They gave a pitiful account of their trials, lack of 
rations, &c., and were clamorous for sometliing to eat as 
soon as brought in. Many of them had been subsisting for 
several days on green apples and raw corn. The Federal 
soldiers generously shared the contents of their haversacks 
with them. 

That Genl. Lee when he took i;)osition behind the Antie- 
tam did remarkably well in bringing Jackson, McLaws and 
Walker uy> the west bank of the Potomac, across at Boteler's 
ford and to Sharpsburg, is universally conceded. He has 
been criticised for fighting with a treacherous river at his 
back, fordable but not bridged, but who has not been criti- 
cised? The military writers say there have been but five 
great Captains — Alexander, Hannibal, Ctesar, Frederick and 
Napoleon. The English and Germans contend that the 



11 

greatest of tliesc was Fre^-lerick ; the French, Napoleon. 
The Napoleon of the literature of war, Jomini, thought liis 
royal master, whom lie deserted, was the greatest. Dnfour 
thought likewise. Schalk leans toward his fellow-Teuton, 
Frederick. It is their quarrel ; let them fight it out. One 
thing is very sure, our war did not add .a name to the his- 
torical roster. And, we ask again, who has not been criti- 
cised ? When Frederick, in the December cold of 1757, 
with only 30,000 men attacked Daun and his 86,000 Aus- 
trians at Leuthen, defeated him, routed him completely, 
tore liim all to pieces, inflicting upon him a loss of 50,000 
men and all his material, did not one of his own generals, 
the Duke of Bevern, criticise his plan and time of attack? 
When Napoleon had, as a mere youth, astounded the world 
by his military successes and carried the Eagles of France 
over Italy, defeated the Austrian armies as fast as the Aulic 
Council could organize and forward them, and shut Wurm- 
ser up in Mantua, did not that grim old veteran exclaim : — 
" AVhat the devil is the matter with this young man? he 
don't fight according to the books " — and when he had 
shown himself at a later day a wonderful comuiander in 
northern fields, did not an able General, Moreau, say sneer- 
ingly : — " Conqueror he may be, but he conquers at the rate 
of 10,000 lives a day." 

The officers and writers will criticise all operations in war, 
whether such enterprises succeed or fail, but the world looks 
only at the big results, as thus : — The world knows Napo- 
leon was the victor at Wagram, but it does not stop to think 
that he outnumbered Charles by thirty tliousand men, and 
tliat he should have come off victorious ; it knows he was 
beaten at Waterloo — worse than beaten, routed — but it does 
not consider that when old " Marshal Forwarts " came on the 
field he was outnumbered two to one ; it knows Mack sur- 
rendered to him at Ulm, but it does not know that by a 
series of magnificent marches and far-reaching combina- 
tions he had 100,000 more men on the field than Mack, who 
was justified in surrendering; it knows the Russians were 



12 

defeated at the Alma, bat it does not know they were doubly 
outnumbered by the allies ; it knows that near the town of 
Koniggratz, in 186G, the Prussians defeated the Austrians, 
on the field of vSadovva that trembled under the tramp of 
4()0,000 men, but it does not know that the Prussians had 
60,000 more available men than the Austri^xns, and tliat 
they were armed with breech-loaders and their enemy had 
muzzle-loaders ; it knows generally that the Confederates 
were beaten finally, and those who shall come after us will 
look only at that big result, but very few of them will ana- 
lyze the whys and wherefores. 

That Genl. Lee should be criticised for making a stand 
behind the Antietam, was to be expected. The closet-sol- 
diers and carpet-knights in the light of subsequent events 
find much to find fault with, but they have not considered 
that he had a deep insight into the slow and methodical 
character of his opponent, and he was in ignorance of the 
big fact that a copy of his order, referred to above, was in 
his opponent's hands. 

Of course any wejl-read school-boy can know more of 
Waterloo to-day than Napoleon, Wellington, Grouchy, Blii- 
cher, Ney and Thielman knew on June 18th, 1815, and the 
same boy can know more of Antietam to-day than all tlie 
officers and men wlio drew saber and pulled trigger under 
McClellan and Lee on this field knew in Sept., 1862. The 
student cannot criticise fairly what officers did then, by tak- 
ing into consideration what he, in the light of the mass of 
evidence that is extant noiv, knows at present. 

That Genl. Lee deserves great credit for concentrating his 
army behind the Antietam so well it would be unfair to deny. 
It is altogether likely that he would not have made the 
stand he did here could he have foreseen how heavily his 
army was to be reduced by straggling ere it was positioned, 
or had he known his numerical inferiority, and that JNlcClel- 
lan had his order. 

When, in the afternoon of Sept. 15, McClellan's advance 
reached the left bank of the Antietam he had with him his 



.13 

1st, 2(1, Otii, and 12th Corps and Pleasanton's cavalry — 
50,000 men at least. Genl. Lee had on the oi)})Osite bank 
only Longstreet's, D. H. Hill's and a part of Stuart's com- 
mands — not 12,000. This certainly was a big opportunity 
for McClellan, but his constitutional caution interyened and 
he failed to strij^e. 

It cannot be pleaded that McClellan did not know the 
general situation. He was familiar with the field of opera- 
tions; he knew^ the situation of his own troops, and, what is 
very rare in the heat and hurry of an active campaign, he 
was in full possession of his enemy's plans. But it can be 
said in extenuation of his slowness and caution that he was 
very ill informed as to the numbers of his opponent. And 
then again it can be further said that no trained officer could 
look over the field from the left bank and not see that the 
Confederates had chosen an admirable defensive position. 

Genl. Lee made a large showing on the right bank with 
wdiat troops he had in hand, and this deceived the Federal 
offtcers, but Genl. Pleasanton, who was well in the advance, 
has assured us that he was positive that Lee had but com- 
paratively few troops at hand on the 15th, and he felt sure 
that so many were kept in sight for a " scare." He com- 
municated this to McC, but it aj)pears he thought otherwise. 

At any rate, the o})portunity slipped away from McC. on 
the loth and 16th, too, and these two days he spent in bring- 
ing up troops and batteries, finding fords and distributing 
supplies. Genl. Lee was very busy too and couriers were 
flying across the Potomac to Jackson, McLaws and Walker, 
ordering them to report at Sharpsburg with their troops at 
the earliest possible moment. 

There was a lively artillery duel across the Antietam on 
the 16th, but the Confederates having I'ewer ritied guns than 
their opponents could not cope with them, and their guns were 
withdrawn to save them from useless sacrifice of men and 
horses. This was a very warm day and in its early hours, 
as we have said, Lee had at hand but Longstreet, D. H. Hill 
and Stuart. In the morning, after a fine marcli, Jackson 



14 

arrived at Sharpsburg, witli J. R. Jones's and Lawton's di- 
visions, and took position' on Genl. Lee's left. A little later 
Walker's division arrived. McLaws's and Anderson's di- 
visions did not arrive till the morning of the 17th, and A. 
P. Hill's division till well into the afternoon of the same da3^ 

Inasmuch as McC. struck no serious blow till the morning 
of the 17tli, it will be seen that Genl. Lee was entirely suc- 
cessful in bringing together his scattered army ere that blow 
fell. This may be discreditable to McClellan, but it is cer- 
tainly creditable to Lee. ^ 

Genl. Lee had seen much service and knew the tremen- 
dous advantage in modern warfare in securing the tactical 
defensive. Profoundly versed in the literature of war, he 
recalled Napoleon's advice to INIarmont : — " Choose your 
l)Osition, Marechal, and make the enemy attack you ; " and 
as a student he was fiimiliar with Wellington's battles 
where he had accomplished so much by selecting a position 
and holding it till the right time came to assume the offen- 
sive, as he did at Salamanca, Talavera and Waterloo. 

After turning over man}^ books and reports, conversing 
with a large number of officers and men engaged on either 
side, and going over the field many times since the battle, 
we believe Genl. Lee had about 40,000 officers and men en- 
gaged, and McClellan had about 60,000. ■ It is well known 
that Lee threw into action all the troops and guns he could 
lay his hands on — he had no reserves when the battle ended 
on the 17th. It is C|uite as well known that McC. fought 
warily ; held back his reserves and did not use all the 87,000 
men he says he had — indeed, he could not have done so, as 
many of them were far in his rear, straggling. It is neces- 
sary to* Aveigh reports made in the heat of Avar with great 
care. Two Federal generals wrote from this field that the 
Confederate loss, in killed and wounded, was 40,000 — utter 
nonsense. On the other hand, a Confederate Lieutenant 
General, in his official report dated nearly a month after the 
battle, says: — "Before it was entirely dark " (on the 17th) 
" the 100,000 men that had been threatening our destruction 



15 

for twelve hours bad melted away into a few stragglers," and 
yet the whole Confederate army, on the night of the ISth, 
retreated from these " few stragglers." Officers are human, 
and where we find them willing to lay down their lives 
for their Cause, we must look for prejudiced reports. 

The officers in each army, in their reports, complain bit- 
terly of their men straggling. We wish to turn aside just 
here a moment and say a word in favor of the enlisted men. 
Should you stand on Broadway and pick out, as the throng- 
passed, a number of men in their physical prime, and march 
them sixty miles in three days, many of them would straggle. 
Now, should you equip these men as Federal soldiers were 
equipped, or feed them as scantily as Confederate soldiers 
were fed, and march them over the same distance in the 
same time, the straggling would be heavier still. To be 
sure it can be said that such men would not be inured to 
marching ; but though they were inured, many of them 
would straggle. The Confederates had been marched and 
fought hard, and their rations had been very short for many 
days prior to Sept. 16, 1802. The Federal soldiers had not 
been marched so severely, but they had carried heavier bur- 
dens in the shape of knapsacks, haversacks, blankets, &c., 
than the Confederates ever did. We had campaigned for 
quite two years ere we learned the wliolesome lesson from 
the Confederates that our men were shamefully overloaded. 
We saw, after the North Carolina campaign, before a Board 
of Federal officers, one of their men strij^ped and weighed — 
he weighed 162 pounds. He was then ordered to dress, arm 
and equip himself — he, his dress, arms and equipments 
weighed 204 pounds. It will be seen that on a march he 
carried 42 pounds. The Confederates never overloaded their 
men in any such way. Men are but men. A soldier is not 
a steam-engine nor a mule ; there is a limit to human en- 
durance and possibilities and it is the duty of a General in 
Command to know and figure on that fact. 

There are times in all campaigns when Generals must 
make a certain point and hard marching is necessary ; but 



when such times come and such marches are made, straggling 
to a greater or less extent must occur. When Hooker made 
the brilliant flank movement from Stafford to Chancellors- 
ville, in 18G3, he marched his men, each encumbered with 
GO i:»ounds, 37 miles in two days and bridged and crossed 
two streams. Such outrageous overloading caused great 
discontent and much straggling. It seems to be the height 
of folly to wear men out with such tremendous burdens and 
expect from them efficient action in battle. There have 
been times in Continental Europe and in Egypt when men 
have made almost incredible marches, but they threw away 
their knapsacks and all else not absolutely necessary, and 
the surgeons lifted them up with exhilarating drugs just 
before exhaustion, as physicians do the six-days-go-as-you- 
please blackguards over tan. The Federal soldiers often 
threw away clothing and equipments on marches too, but 
in a few days they would be inspected, and be obliged to 
rc})lace what articles were missing, from their pay. This 
caused much discontent. We have seen many Federal sol- 
diers who would far rather go into action and take their 
chances than go on a forced march fully ecjuipped. 

That the straggling from each army was very heavy is 
true, and that that could not be helped is true too. 

It being impossible to place hands on any data that will 
give the number of stragglers from each army, we think it 
fair to assume that Genl. Lee had- in action on Se})t. 17th 
about 40,000 officers and men and McClellan 60,000. 

Genl. Lee's position behind the Antietam was well chosen, 
and the calm and steady Longsti'cet commanded his centre 
and right, and the Ijrilliant Jackson, as thoroughly at home 
on the defensive as in his turning movements, was on his 
left. His men made the best use of their time in throwing 
up crude breastworks with fence-rails where it was thought 
they would be necessary. The morning artillery duel of 
the IGth had ceased, the gunners were idle, and the skir- 
mishers at the front only were busy. 

No one could throw his eye over even an outline maj) of the 



17 

field and note the Potomac and the Antietam wriggling 
through the country without knowing at once that the 
vicinity is mountainous. 

In the Confederate front was the Antietam ; on their flanks 
and rear was the Potomac. In the rear of the line, drawn 
in front of Sharpshurg, are two fords of the Potomac ; Bote- 
ler's ford, about a mile east of Shepherdstown, and another 
about 3J miles above, as the crow flies, near Cox's house. 
These, if necessary, were to be thai r^-- lines of retreat. The 
field itself is not mountainous, but rolling, and is cut by 
several creeks — trifling little trickles that have not been 
christened. The Antietam is aborit 70 feet wide. We say 
about ; of course it varies, but it averages about that, and 
along the hostile front it w^as spanned by three substantial 
stone bridges, that are twelve or fifteen feet wide and 150 
feet long, with stone parapets four feet high ; three arches 
under each bridge. The lower bridge is now and probably 
ever wdll be called the Burnside bridge ; the next bridge 
above is on the Sharpshurg and Boonsboro' road. It is said 
tliat this bridge is but a mile from the Burnside bridge ; it 
is the longest mile you ever saw. We have j^aced the 
ground frequently and found it a mile and a third. It 
may be but a mile as the crow flies, but you cannot march 
troops as crows fly. Some three-fourths of a mile above 
this bridge, a little east of Kennedy's house, is the third 
bridge. There is another bridge farther up, but this was 
out of fire ; it was called the ujiper bridge. Besides the 
bridges there are two fords close to Burnside's bridge ; one 
three or four hundred yards below, the other the same dis- 
tance above ; and there are two upper fords — one a little 
below Pry's mill, the other immediately west of Pry's Viouse. 
The Antietam is sluggish and flows in a deep ravine, 
almost a valley ; the ground back of the banks on the 
east side, from the center bridge south, springing up from 
70 to 80 feet ; on the west side it is not quite so high. About 
two miles east of the stream the Red Hills rise from 350 to 
400 feet, by aneroid. These commanding heights were 
3 



18 

immediately used by tlie Federals for signal stations and 
their possession gave them a very great advantage, as from 
them, as the field is generall}^ an o]3en one, every day-move- 
ment made by the Confederates was seen by the signal 
officers and telegraphed to McClellan's headquarters but 
two miles distant. McClellan's headquarters were at Pry's 
house. In nearly all the maps and reports this is put 
down Fry's ; that is an error. A Mr. Poffenburger lives 
there now. 

It was not the intention of the Confederates to defend the 
bridgeheads with any very heavy force, as the Federal artil- 
lery could have battered them too severely had their men 
and guns been placed there, but rather to delay the Federal 
advance at the bridges as long as they could with some 
artillery and men, and fight the main battle nearer Sharps- 
burg, where they could, on the defensive, take advantage of 
the many stone walls and fences that ran generally north 
and south. 

Genl. Lee placed his lines to the north, south and east of 
Sharpsburg about so : Jackson on his left, Longstreet on his 
center and right ; to the left of Jackson, almost touching the 
Potomac, was Stuart, with his cavalry dismounted, ready to 
act as infantry, and his batteries, about 30 guns. From 
Stuart Jackson strung along his divisions, facing north and 
east, down to the southeast of the Dunker church, where 
they connected with D. H. Hill's division ; Hill's division 
connected with the left of Longstreet's divisions, which faced 
east and continued down to the Burnside bridge and below. 
Burnside's bridge was defended by Genl. Tombs with Genl. 
D. R. Jones's *division in support. 

As the Confederate left and center were formed the good 
road, which leads from Sharpsburg north, ran in their rear, 
and this was made excellent use of by Genl. Lee to rein- 
force his left when in danger of being overwhelmed, by 
marching troops from his right and center. About a mile 
north of Sharpsburg, west of this road, is an oak woods. 
A quarter of a mile north of this is another woods. South- 



19 

east of this is still another woods. These woods are much 
as they were in 18G2, having been thinned but little since. 
The Dunker church is on the easterly side of the first-named 
woods. Two houses have been built near it since the battle 
that partially hide it from view as you stand in what is now 
the National Cemetery and look north. The Sharpsburg 
and Ilagerstown road was and is partially flanked by stone 
walls on both sides, making it strong for the defense, and a 
ridge but a few rods west of it rises a few feet, on which ar- 
tillery was placed, and its infantry support w^as well shel- 
tered behind it. In the woods about the Dunker church 
outcropping ledges of rock afforded excellent cover for in- 
tantry. To the west of the northern end of the woods about 
the Dunker church is a height, sixty-five feet higher than 
any ground in its immediate vicinity and three or four acres 
in extent. No one could stand on that knoll and not see 
what a tremendous fire from a few batteries placed thereon 
could have been poured into the Confederate left and left 
rear. It would have been decisive. 

It is hard to impress upon those who never saw field op- 
erations the great advantage in securing the tactical defen- 
sive. Look at Fredericksburg. Greater gallantry was never 
seen on any field than the Federals showed there in charg- 
ing the heights again and again. The Confederates granted 
them that meed of praise generously, and yet, using but 
20,000 or 25,000 men, they could afford to laugh at the 
Federal assaults and, with a loss of less than 5,000 men, 
they hurled back the Army of the Potomac with a loss to 
it of 13,000. At Malvern Hill, in the gallant Confederate 
charge on the Federal artillery, well supported by infantry, 
the Southern loss was terrific and the loss to their oppo- 
nents was but trifling. At Gettysburg, in the Confederate 
charge of the 3d day, we see six or eight thousand men 
killed and wounded and the defenders punished but little. 
At Cold Harbor a loss of 15,000 was inflicted upon the army 
on the offensive while the loss to the army lying behind 
their works was less than a thousand. Good advice was 



20 

given by one of the masters in the Art of War: — " Never 
attack a position in front that can be turned." 

The fine position Genl. Lee secured here sliowed his wis- 
dom ; the ability he exercised in concentrating liis scattered 
army to take it showed his skill ; the gallant tenacity he 
brought into play to hold it for two bloody days showed 
the valor of his troops. And as McClellan was so ill ad- 
vised as to the numbers of his opponent, the determination 
to attack his enemy in his chosen position showed a conclu- 
sion that was very creditable to him ; his marching Pope's 
beaten army from Washington, reorganizing it on that 
march, and bringing it to the east bank of the Antietam in 
good condition showed his ability as an organizer, and the 
enthusiasm of the troops whenever he appeared among 
them showed the love they bore him. 

Permit another digression right here. Artillery unsup- 
ported by infantry is anything but an effective arm. A 
battery can be neutralized and crippled by a dozen good 
sharpshooters. You cannot fight skirmishers with cannon 
any more than you can fight musquitoes with fowling-pieces. 
Sharpshooters, fighting on their bellies, can creep or roll close 
to guns and pick off the gunners, and they are powerless to 
prevent. But if artillery has infantry support, and from 
that infantry support a few skirmishers and sharpshooters 
are taken and sprinkled in its front to care for the enemy's 
skirmishers and sharpshooters when they come, it then be- 
comes a tremendous arm. A battery, or several batteries in 
line, with infantry lying down in its rear as sujiport, when 
charged by infantry, can punish that infantry frightfully 
with canister. That punishment is generally sufficient to 
stop any such charge ; should it not be, the supporting in- 
fantry rises and passes through the guns and meets such 
charge with a counter-charge that is almost always suc- 
cessful. 

Artillery fire at a long distance, say from six or eiglit hun- 
dred yards to a mile, does very little general damage to 
infantry on the defensive. It may demoralize green troops, 



21 

but men who liave heard such racket before know how to 
take care of themselves — the day has gone by when armies 
are put to rout by breaking pitchers, blowing trumpets, and 
holding up lamps. When infantry on the defensive receives 
artillery fire from a distance, they lie close to the ground and 
nearly all the shot and shell pass beyond them or fall short. 
Occasionally a shell may explode and kill and wound men? 
but such fire does no general damage. 

After the artillery duels of the IGth ceased the Confederate 
gunners had orders to indulge in them no more, but to re- 
serve tlieir ammunition for the charges that the Federal 
infantry might make, and they did reserve it to^a very good 
purpose, as we shall see. Each army had an abundance of 
artillery at hand. The Federals had a much larger number 
of guns than the Confederates, but neither army had suffi- 
cient ground for it to bring into action all the weight of 
metal it possessed — Genl. Lee's lines were not over four miles 
long Avhen tlie ball opened, and they were shorter than that 
at sundown of the 17th. It must be remembered, however, 
that the Confederates had no opportunity to replenish their 
ammunition train from Richmond since their battles in Vir- 
ginia,, but they had captured some stores at Harper's Feury. 
The Federal artillery was very well supplied in Washington 
before it marched up into Maryland. 

(With your permission we will not describe a mass of 
tactical details of the two days ; they could not be better 
told than Genl. Palfrey tells them in his late and most ad- 
mirable work — " The Antietam and Fredericksburg, New 
York, Scribner's Sons, 1882.") 

General Lee's project was the defensive with offensive re- 
turns should circumstances permit. Genl. McClellan de- 
termined to fight an offensive battle, and his ])lan was to 
throw two or three, or, if necessary, four cor^DS across tlie 
Antietam at the upper bridge and ford, attack the Con- 
federate left ; then advance his left and attack their right, 
and when either of these movements should be successful, 
advance his center. With this end in view Hooker was 



22 

ordered at 2 p. m. of the IGth to cross witli his corps at the 
upper bridge and ford, and attack tlie Confederate left. 
Brave Old Joe was very right in feeling ticklish about this; 
he expressed the opinion that " Bob Lee's whole army will 
bounce my corps on the other side and eat us up," but McC. 
promised to sup|)ort liim with other corps and so he did. 
Hooker crossed at the upjier bridge and ford, a little before 
4 p. m., marched northwest about two miles and then south, 
and struck Genl. Hood's division on Miller's farm. He had 
three divisions, Doubleday's, Ricketts's, and Meade's, and he 
claims that he drove Hood's division back. Hood, on the 
other hand, claims that he lield his ground at first and then 
drove Hooker. The fighting was done principally by Meade's 
division, and there is no doubt that the pressure of superior 
numbers against Hood, as he fought well advanced from the 
main Confederate lines, gradually forced him back. All the 
firing did not cease till quite 9 p. m., when Hood was re- 
lieved by Lawton, with two brigades, and he retired to the 
rear to feed his hungry men. 

As Hooker swung himself out of his saddle he said to his 
staff: " We are through 'for to-niglit, gentlemen, but to- 
morrow we fight tlie battle of the war." During the. night 
Genl. Mansfield, with the 12th corps, crossed where Hooker 
did and bivouacked about a mile in his rear, facing south ; 
Genl. Sumner with his corps, the 2d, crossed early the next 
morning, the 17th, and this was to be the day of l)attle. 

At early dawn Hooker advanced and attacked .Jackson, 
who had there the brigades of Jones, Winder, Lawton, 
Triml)le, and Hays, witli six batteries. Jackson was also 
greatly assisted by Stuart's guns on his extreme left, and by 
Hood's and part of D. II. Hill's divisions on his right, and 
another small brigade, and all the rest of the Confederate 
artillery on their right and right-center. The fighting was 
begun at the west side of the woods to the north and east of 
the Sharpsburg road, and the Confederates, after an awful 
struggle, were forced back to the wt)ods about the Dunker 
church. 



23 

By tliis time the punishment these troops had inflicted 
upon each other had shaken all fight out of them for the 
time being, and many stragglers were streaming to the rear 
from each side, and the long-range Federal batteries across 
the Antietam began to drop their shell into the Confederate 
ranks. 

During a lull and breathing-time the Confederate officers 
made their men lie down to escape the artillery fire ; then 
they assumed the offensive most gallantly and began to make 
Hooker give way. 

At this time about 7 a. m. Genl. Mansfield, with the 12th 
Corps, arrived. He, an educated officer of high character, 
was mortally wounded while his men were deploying — his 
command passed into the hands of Williams. Hooker's and 
Williams's men forced the Confederates back again until the 
Southern batteries were uncovered ; these, opening with can- 
ister, held the Federals in check. Here was seen the wisdom 
of the Confederate artilleries holding their fire till it could 
be used against infantry. This was one of the most terrible 
struggles of the war. An oificer of rank, who was closely 
related to Jackson officially, has informed us that lie never 
saw him depressed in any battle but this. He felt and knew 
that he was greatly outnumbered, but he used the two arms, 
infantr}^ and artillery, so effectively that he was not driven 
from the woods about the Dunker church. 

At this juncture the combatants were fought out again, 
and Genl. Sumner, with the powerful 2d Corps, arrived on 
the field, at 9 a. ra. As he went to the front he met Hooker 
who was being taken to the rear, wounded. He afterwards 
stated, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
that Hooker's corps was dispersed and routed. This was 
an error. The 1st Corps was much demoralized by their 
heavy casualties ; they had charged the Confederates ; had 
forced them back to their batteries in position, and had suf- 
fered terribly from canister ; their right flank had been much 
battered by Stuart's artillery fire from Jackson's left ; they 
had received the confederate counter-charge and had been 



24 

punished terribly, Ijut they were not dispersed and routed — 
they were lying down to escape the shower of canister from 
the Confederate guns. 

Wlien Sumner arrived it seemed that the preponderance of 
force would surely sweep the Confederates from the field, 
but his dispositions w^ere so faulty, the Confederates, having 
just received reinforcements from their center and left — the 
divisions of McLaws and Walker — assumed the offensive 
once more, hurled back his right division under Sedgwick, 
and all of Hooker's and Williams's men across the space in- 
tervening between the east and west w^oods, clear to the 
western edge of the east woods — the original position as- 
sumed at dawn. The Confederates made no attempt to 
hold the ground they had won, but retired to the woods 
about the Danker church. As the}^ retired Hooker's men, 
now under Meade, Williams's men, Sedgwick's men, now 
under Howard, as Sedgwick was twice wounded, followed 
them. The P^ederals in all this had foughf ftxcing south and 
southwest. ()i Sumner's corps Sedgwick's division only had 
thus far been engaged. As a diversion he ordered his next 
division under French to attack, and it did attack facing 
west. This attack fell upon D. H. Hill's division, reinforced 
by Anderson's division, and they were forced back to the 
sunken road that branches off from the turnpike south of the 
Dunker church. This road and the high ground west of it 
was an excellent defensive position for Hill, and his artillery, 
and other guns in his rear, assisted him greatly in holding it 
as long as he did. Sumner's other division under Rich- 
ardson fought to the south and left of French, and it came 
under a tremendous artillery fire from Longstreet's left, but 
these two divisions, as a large part of Hill's force had been 
diverted earlier in the day to assist Jackson in resisting 
Hooker and Williams, gradually forced Hill and Anderson 
back nearly to the turnpike on which stands the Dunker 
church. Hill says affairs looked very critical, but with a 
very few men he attempted a flank attack on the Federals 
just then, and that deceived them as to the weakness of that 
particular point in the Confederate lines. 



25 

All the figlitiiig tlius far, excepting distant artillery fire, 
had been done by the Federal right and the Confederate 
left, and the three corps that had made these attacks had 
been thrown in at different times. About this time, 12 m., 
Genl. Franklin, with two divisions of the Gth Corps, arrived 
on the field. His divisions w^ere commanded by Genls. Slo- 
cum and W. F. Smith. One of Smith's brigades charged 
and gained possession of the Dunker church. Franklin, 
after a hurried survey of affairs, concluded that both sides 
were fought out, and the side that should assume the offen- 
sive just then would sweep the field. With this end in view 
he formed the rest of his two divisions to charge the woods 
in the rear of the Dunker church. After he had formed, 
and just as he was about to sound the charge, Sumner rode 
up and asked wdiat he purposed doing. Franklin explained, 
but Sumner forbade it as his corps was not sufficiently reor- 
ganized to support such a charge. Franklin obeyed Sumner, 
but he had it so much to heart that he sent for McClellail. 
After he reached there and listened to the point in contro- 
versy, he advised Franklin not to make the charge but to 
wait and see what Burnside would accomplish on the Con- 
federate left. In all human probability such a charge, just 
then and there, would have been crowned with the success 
that Franklin hoj)ed for. 

The Confederate extreme right rested near the Burnside 
bridge on the hills immediately west of it. It was defended 
by Genl. D. R. Jones's division ; the bridge-head being en- 
trusted to Genl. Toombs, with but two or three small regi- 
ments. The position is a very powerful one for the defense 
and the Confederates had many guns at hand. Burnside 
with the 9th Corps was ordered to attack there as early as 8 
a. m. He delayed and delayed so long that McClellan sent 
repeated orders for him to attack with his whole corps. Al- 
though he had orders the day before to reconnoitre the ap- 
proaches to the bridge witii care; although the country 
people in the vicinity were ripe and ready to give him all 
the information he needed; although he had all his troops 
4 



20 

in hand to make forced reconnoissances, he knew so little of 
the terrain when he received his orders of the 17th, he lost a 
half thousand men in a front charge on the bridge before he 
learned of the fords — one below and one above it — by which 
it might be turned. 

He opened up the attack with artillery and such was his 
slowness, the heavy assaults on the Confederate left and left- 
center were over and the troops there were resting on their 
arms Ijefore he cleared the Ijridge. After repeated assaults 
made by the 2d Maryland regiment, the 6th New Hampshire, 
and Ferrero's brigade, the bridge was carried by 1 p. m. 
About the same time the ford below it was carried by Rod- 
man's division. The Confederates retreated from the bridge- 
head and took position on high ground directly west of it. 
Another unaccounted for delay of two hours then occurred 
before Burnside's advance was begun. Then, as by this 
time the whole 9th Corps hadbeenthrownover, it advanced 
and crowded the Confederates back to the outskirts of Sharps- 
burg, but no farther. 

It is but fair to state that Burnside's troops greatly out- 
numbered Jones's division, but they overcame a severe ar- 
tillery fire from their front, and the guns of the right-center 
of the Confederate lines were turned upon them as they ad- 
vanced. Genls. Jones's and Toomb's troops fell back in great 
disorder to Sharpsburg, and many of Burnside's skirmishers 
reached the southeast edge of the town, but about this time, 
5 p. m., Genl. A. P. Hill's light division arrived and joined 
hands with Genl. Jones and they assumed the offensive, and 
with the assistance of their batteries drove Burnside's men 
back over much of the ground they had gained. That ended 
the operations on the Confederate right. 

At the center bridge the 1st brigade of Porter's corps 
crossed, preceded by skirmishers and Genl. Plcasanton's 
four batteries, twenty-four guns, and supported by all the 
Federal artillery on the east bank of the Antietam that 
could be brought to bear upon the Confederate center. This 
attack drove from the lieight immediately east of Sharps- 



27 

burg nearly all the Confederate artillery that had been in 
position there. 

And the day was done and the night came down; the 
field was left to the surgeons and chaplains, and grim 
Death wagged his bony jaws gleefully over his feast and 
gorged himself with many more victims ere the dawn of the 
IStli, and that was Thursday. 

After nightfall of the 17th the Confederates readjusted their 
thinned lines as best they could, and their position all along 
was scarcely a mile in the rear of that which they had held 
at early dawn, and this was all that had been gained by the 
Federals. It was what the Federal soldiers called a "string- 
fight." When they saw a town or village strung along a 
road, they called it a " string-town," and when they saw a 
battle where but a corps was thrown in at a time, they called 
it a " string-fight." This battle was so " stringy " and the 
mettle of the Southern troops was such that, after fourteen 
hours' hard pounding, it ended in a draw. 

The two armies bivouacked and kind Nature did not look 
with horror upon the awful slaughter and burst into tears 
as she did after Gettysburg, but the cold stars twinkled mer- 
rily o'er 20,000 dead and wounded men, and the wearied 
troops slejot on the bloody field. 

General McClellan has been harshly criticised for not fol- 
lowing up his partial success the next day, as Generals 
Burnside and Franklin urged. As Swinton so aptly states, 
there was a special reason why the Federals could hope for 
a decided success should they again attack on the 18th — 
their attention was attracted to the height to the northwest 
of the woods about the Dunker church, referred to above, 
and Franklin advised its seizure ; besides, Burnside had a 
secure footing west of the lower bridge, from which he could, 
without preliminaries, attack the Confederate right. After 
a night of anxious deliberation, McClellan decided not to 
renew the attack till the 19th, and when his troops moved 
forward this day they found that the Confederates had re- 



28 

treated, with great skill and complete success, the night of 
the 18th and placed the Potomac between them and their 
adversaries. 

It has been our humble pride and j^leasure to go over this 
field many times. We were there last two or three Sundays 
ago. Where was then the dread chaos of War is now calm 
Peace and rustic simplicity ; where was then the scream of 
shot and shell, grape, the bullet and the Minie, we heard 
that Sunday Bob White's mellow whistle, and saw the timid 
hare with his constant flag of truce ; where were then death 
and wounds, the anesthetic and the knife, we heard the 
church bells ringing out " Peace on Earth and Good Will to 
Men" — and we rode into the Cemetery, dismounted, and sat 
on a knoll and looked across the pretty hills and mountains 
and then down upon the quaint town of Sharpsburg : " Buried 
here 4,006." These were all Federal soldiers, but they were 
not all killed on the field ; this number comprises those who 
were killed and those who died in the field hospitals after 
the battle, and the Confederates lost quite as many ; in all 
more than 8,000, and what was all this for? Since Cain 
slew Abel, men have fought. Our little ones can turn to 
their school-books, and see and know that, and when those 
little ones come to man's estate the larger tomes will show 
them that scarce a nation ever passed a quarter century 
without war. Look back, if your age will permit, and tell 
us what you thought when blood was flowing in the Crimea. 
Did you not think and say our country was so circumstanced 
that War could not come to us ? And yet in less than ten 
years thereafter our fair land quivered under the marching 
feet of two million men. We fancied Neptune would drown 
Mars ere he could reach our sliores, but oh ! how grievously 
we erred in that. 

Ere our National Life had rounded a century we had four 
wars, and war will come to us again. How, why, when, 
where? That it is not o-iven unto us to know, but, unless 



29 

Clio is the veriest lying jade, come it will and it behooves us 
as a People to be ready for it ; so, ye Law-makers on Capitol 
Hill yonder, touch not your Military or Naval Academy. 

More than eight thousand here, and what was all this, for? 
If there be a special Providence in the fall of a sparrow, 
these gallant men from North, from South, from East, from 
West died not in vain. No. This precious seed was sown 
here and the harvest was Unity, and what is the aftermath ? 
Have we not better money, trade, manufactures, commerce, 
laws, than we had before 18(31? Did not tlie awful expe- 
rience of a four years' war, the Nation's adversity, bring out 
its true greatness and character, and carry it farther toward 
solidity, strength, confidence, thrift, tlian a century of drowsy 
Peace could have done ? And more : — did not the gallant 
Southern men who fought us here see through that blood 
and toil and strife the true value of Unity, and should a 
foreign foe raise hand against us, would they not loyally 
rally under the Old Flag, and give their grit, and skill, and 
valor to defend it? Truly, " He works in a mysterious way 
His wonders to perform." 

The forgotten poetic dwarf, the crooked little thing that 
asked questions, dubbed him who first saw the light three 
centuries before our war burst upon us, " the greatest, wisest, 
meanest of mankind," butMacaulay said he was " the Prince 
of Philosophers"; and what said this prince of philosoj^hers ? 
He said :- — " It is enough to point at, that no nation, which 
doth not directly profess arms, may look to have greatness 
fall into their mouths. * * * No body can be healthful 
without exercise, neither natural body nor politic, and, cer- 
tainly, to a kingdom, or an estate, a just and honorable war 
is the true exercise." 

Reasoning from the past we know there is food for whole- 
some thought and a world of wisdom in that ; but let come 
what will, whether our children and children's children die 
in their beds or on the field in years to come, as we looked 
across Antietam field that Sunday and heard the church- 



30 

bells, we felt a calm peace and comfort that cannot be taken 
away when we saw the spires pointing upward ; and we 
knew that eighteen hundred and eighty-two 3''ears ago a 
young recruit enlisted in our poor ranks at Bethlehem, who 
brought with Him a Countersign to pass us into Higher 
Camps ; and we knew further that on the Last Day when 
Gabriel sounds the Reveille there will be no more wars nor 
rumors of wars but all, all will be well. 

CLARENCE F. COBB, 
Late Private, dtli Corps, U. S. Army. 

Baltimore, Md., 3Iarch 12, 1883. 





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